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ACCESS TO ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE
DIFFICULTIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN RENEWABLE
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Nicholas M. Ravotti*
Abstract
By many measures, Indian tribal members live at a significant
disadvantage as compared to non-Indian citizens when it comes to poverty,
food security, and prevalence of violent crime. One measure of
disadvantage that is not frequently discussed is that many Indian tribal
members living in Indian Country do not have ready access to electrical
energy. Yet, the Department of Energy states that over 14 billion megawatt
hours (MWh) of solar resources and 1.1 billion MWh of wind resources are
available in Indian Country. The presence of such abundant renewable
energy resources begs the question of why access to energy in Indian
Country is so low. This is especially troublesome when considering that
wind and solar energy resources can be developed as either utility-scale
grid-connected facilities, or as small-scale geographically distributed
facilities that service individual households. In essence, renewable energy
sources are the ideal forms of energy to bring energy access to Indian
Country. This Article explores how centuries of changing federal policy
toward Indian tribal governments and tribal members have shaped the
current state of energy access in Indian Country. Furthermore, this Article
examines how economic incentives such as the Investment Tax Credit, the
Production Tax Credit, feed-in tariffs, net metering, and state renewable
portfolio standards have been successful at bringing renewable energy
generation online, but actually steer renewable energy development away
from Indian Country to the detriment of tribal governments, tribal members,
energy developers, and energy consumers.

* Indian Law Staff Attorney at Wisconsin Judicare, Inc.; J.D., American University
Washington College of Law; B.S. in Natural Resources Management and B.A. in
Environmental Policy, Green Mountain College. I would like to extend my sincerest
gratitude to Professor Ezra Rosser for teaching me the things I didn't know, showing me the
things I thought I knew but didn't know, and encouraging me to seek the answers to the
things I don't yet know.
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I. Introduction
Despite the prevailing notion among non-Indians that Indian reservations
are vast desolate areas with no economic value, tribal lands actually contain
abundant energy resources in the form of coal, oil, and natural gas.1 Both
historically and presently, Indian fossil fuel resources have been a driving
force behind many tribal economies, with royalties from surface and mining
leases totaling $812 million in 2015.2 In addition to the vast fossil fuel

1. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2012) (“Production on Indian
lands represents 5% of domestic oil production, 8% of natural gas production, and 2% of
coal production.”); see also Lynn H. Slade, Mineral and Energy Development on Native
American Lands: Strategies for Addressing Sovereignty, Regulation, Rights and Culture, 56
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5A-1 (2010).
2. Statistical Information, OFFICE OF NAT. RES. REVENUE, http://statistics.onrr.gov/
ReportTool.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (select “Reported Revenues by Category,” then
“FY2015”).
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resources present in Indian Country,3 there are abundant renewable energy
resources available as well.4
Renewable energy resources present a unique opportunity for tribal
governments and tribal members; although fossil fuel resources are
economically lucrative to tribes, the fossil fuel market is subject to
extraordinary uncertainty.5 Additionally, fossil fuel development typically
requires the energy-producing resource to be extracted and removed from
Indian Country for sale on the open market.6 However, renewable energy
resources such as wind and solar are not commodities that can be extracted
and transported. Rather, renewable energy must be sold at the point of
generation.7 Therefore, the tribe has greater control over the resource
production, and may receive a greater immediate benefit from renewable
resource generation since the energy produced therefrom can be consumed
on the reservation.8
3. The term “Indian Country” is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). For the purposes of this Article, the term serves the general
purpose of describing land over which Indian tribes have some regulatory or jurisdictional
authority. When a tribe-specific or statute-specific definition is required, it will be provided.
4. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL ON INDIAN LANDS 23-26 (Apr. 2000),
https://www.eia.gov/renewable/archive/neaf0001.pdf (listing and discussing reservations
with the highest potential for renewable energy projects).
5. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of
Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 505-07 (2008) (discussing increases in fuel
costs and the adverse effects these increases have on consumers’ behavior).
6. See Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/public-benefits-ofrenewable.html#references (last revised Apr. 8, 2013) (“[I]n most states renewable electricity
production would reduce the need to spend money on importing coal and natural gas from
other places.”).
7. See id.
8. Cf. Robert Gough, Tribal Wind Power Development in the Northern Great Plains,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 57, 57 (noting that reservations bear the impacts of
extractive energy activities while "the resident tribal communities are the limited end-use
consumers of relatively higher-priced energy services").
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The fact that Indian tribes control vast amounts of renewable energy
resources at a time when the United States is committed to sourcing more
energy from renewable sources9 is great for tribal governments and tribal
members. However, despite the abundance of economically viable energy
resources in Indian Country, by many metrics, Indian citizens in the United
States remain at a significant social and economic disadvantage compared
to non-Indians. Indians have less access to educational opportunities,10
fewer opportunities for gainful employment,11 and are at an increased risk
of violent crime.12 The increased risk of energy insecurity, however, is
often overlooked when discussing Indian social issues, even though access
to energy is critical to human health and wellbeing,13 as well as to economic
security and vitality.14
Unless and until tribes begin to fully utilize their renewable energy
resources, it seems unlikely that the negative socioeconomic factors in
Indian Country will be fully or adequately addressed. Producing power
from renewable energy sources in Indian Country, however, is much more
complex than producing energy from renewable resources on non-tribal
land. This Article will explore those complexities and examine key changes
that can or should be made to enable tribes to capitalize on their renewable
energy resources.
Part II of this Article will provide a brief overview of the field of energy
law, which will provide background and context regarding energy
regulation. Part II will also include a discussion of the federal tax incentives
and state utility rebate incentives that presently drive much of the
renewable energy development in the United States. Part II will examine
how these tax and rebate incentives apply in Indian Country, and how tribes
can best utilize these incentives to develop their renewable energy
9. Press Release, Obama for Am., Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for
America, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pdf (last
visited Apr. 18, 2017).
10. See ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER #370, NATIVE
AMERICANS AND JOBS: THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE 24 (Dec. 17, 2013).
11. See id. at 3.
12. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY INSIGHTS BRIEF: STATISTICS ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN 2 (Feb. 2013).
13. The UN-World Bank Sustainable Energy for All program has declared universal
access to electricity by 2030 as one of its goals, stating that access to energy is fundamental
for economic development and prosperity. See Our Mission, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL,
http://www.se4all.org/our-mission (last visited Apr. 21, 2017).
14. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: ENERGY AND THE
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 44 (Sept. 2000).
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resources. Part III will discuss tribal energy resource agreements in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. Part III will also examine how these
agreements, though intended to enhance energy development in Indian
Country through tribal self-determination and autonomy, are actually
ineffective and paternalistic, and therefore fall short of their intended goal.
Part IV will discuss several Indian-driven solutions to increase access to
energy in Indian Country. Part IV will also provide a brief and high-level
overview of these projects and is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all
the Indian-driven energy projects undertaken in Indian Country. Rather, the
purpose of presenting these projects is to demonstrate not only the breadth
of need for energy development in Indian Country, but also to demonstrate
that successful Indian Country energy development projects are
“unconventional,” in that they address niche problems associated with
energy insecurity in Indian Country. Furthermore, these projects
demonstrate the value in Indian-driven solutions to Indian Country energy
problems. Finally, Part V will offer a brief conclusion.
II. A Brief Primer on Federal Energy Law and Policy
When discussing energy policy in the United States, it is critical to
understand that the United States does not have a single energy policy.
Rather, the United States has a patchwork of policies (both state and
federal) that regulate resource extraction, energy generation, the transfer of
energy-producing commodities, the transmission of energy itself across
state lines and on the national grid, and energy consumption by consumers.
In a similar vein as the field of Indian law, these policies have developed
over more than a century’s time, and have generally tended to be
reactionary rather than the result of long-term strategic planning. Unlike
Indian law, however, United States energy policy is continually changing to
meet the changing needs of industry, commerce, and energy consumers.
The obvious difficulty with this system is that determining or even
coordinating regulatory authority can be difficult and confusing. This is
especially true when resources travel through Indian Country. Some of
these difficulties will be discussed in greater detail in later parts of this
Article. This part is meant to give a brief overview of the United States’
energy policy and the agencies which oversee energy resources.
A. The Foundation of Federal Energy Regulation
Although there are multifarious points in time that could mark the
beginning of energy policy in the United States, the most appropriate point
for the purposes of this Article is the creation of the Department of the
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Interior (DOI) in 1849.15 In 1946, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
was created within the DOI to manage leases and permits for resource
extraction on public lands controlled by the DOI.16 The BLM currently
oversees leasing for coal, oil, and natural gas extraction, as well as leases
for renewable energy development on federal lands.17 As it pertains to
energy policy, the DOI regulates the land parcels in which energyproducing commodities are located, and the BLM regulates the extraction
of these commodities through leases to private entities.18 Prior to expansive
electricity grids and oil and natural gas pipelines, this regulatory authority
represented a substantial portion of United States energy policy since
energy was typically generated near the geographic locality where the
energy-producing commodity was extracted.
In 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which created
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).19 The ICC was charged with
regulating the transportation of goods across state lines by common
carriers.20 The ICC’s regulatory authority was expanded by the Hepburn
Act, which granted the ICC the authority to set a ceiling on the maximum
rate that railroads could charge for the transportation of goods.21 This
authority gave the ICC a substantial amount of influence over energy
prices, as energy-producing commodities began traveling from
geographically isolated areas to larger population centers.22 The Hepburn
Act also represents the first substantial step by the federal government in
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395.
16. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, § 403, 60 Stat. 1097, 1100. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) is also housed within the DOI. BIA is responsible for managing the
federal trust responsibility of the federal government to Indians and tribal resources.
17. What We Manage, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/about/what-wemanage/national (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
18. Statement of Neil Korzne, Director, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department
of the Interior (Mar. 23, 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
Kornze-BLM-Statement-3-23-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing.pdf (delivered at Recent Management of
Oil and Gas Lease Sales by the Bureau of Land Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2016)).
19. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.)
20. Id. § 12, 24 Stat. at 383.
21. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.)
22. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in
Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 AM. U.L. REV.
335, 339-50 (1983) (discussing discriminatory “rate wars” prior to the formation of the ICC,
and the ICC’s authority to set rate schedules).
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recognizing that energy markets require oversight and regulation because of
their broad effects on unrelated sectors of the national economy. The ICC
was ultimately abolished in 1995, and much of its authority transferred to
the newly created Surface Transportation Board within the Department of
Transportation.23 However, the ICC’s regulatory authority over oil pipelines
transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates
energy transmission rates across the national grid.24
The regulation of energy itself, rather than energy-producing
commodities, began in 1920 with the passage of the Federal Water Power
Act (FWPA), which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC).25 The
FPC was initially primarily responsible for licensing hydroelectric dam
development.26 However, the 1935 amendments to the FWPA, known as
the Federal Power Act (FPA),27 expanded the FPC’s regulatory authority to
include wholesale rates and transmission rates of electric energy across
state lines.28 In 1938, the Natural Gas Act (NGA) gave the FPC regulatory
authority over transportation of natural gas across state lines, as well as
regulatory authority over wholesales of natural gas. 29 The FPC
subsequently expanded this authority through a series of cases—Federal
Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,30 Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,31 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin.32
When the FPC set rates for the wholesale natural gas sales of the Natural
Gas Pipeline Company (NPC), the NPC argued in Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
that it was not subject to the FPC ratemaking authority because its business
model did not constitute interstate commerce.33 The NPC produced and
purchased natural gas at its facilities in Texas, and transferred this gas via
pipelines, which it wholly owned, to other wholly owned facilities in
23. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
24. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 980 (2015).
25. Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823
(2012)).
26. Id. § 4, 41 Stat. at 1065-67.
27. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828
(2012)) (title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803).
28. Id.
29. Ch. 556, § 1, 52 Stat. 821, 821 (codified as amended at 515 U.S.C. § 717 (2012)).
30. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
31. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
32. 47 U.S. 672 (1954).
33. 315 U.S. at 581-82.
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Illinois.34 Although the NPC ultimately sold the natural gas wholesale to
Illinois utilities for retail resale to customers, the NPC argued that this was
an intrastate transaction, and that the state should regulate it rather than the
FPC.35 The Court held that even though the FPC’s rate would cost the NPC
significant revenue, the rate was constitutional as long as the ratemaking
process involved two steps. First, the adjustment of the rate must allow for
a fair revenue return to the company, even if not the most profitable
return.36 Second, the rate schedule providing for the fair return must
eliminate discrimination and unfairness from the market.37 The Court
reached this two-step process after analogically reasoning that the ICC was
granted similar ratemaking authority under the Transportation Act of
1920,38 upon which part of the NGA was modeled.39
When the FPC set rates for wholesale natural gas sales at a level below
the profit margins of Hope Natural Gas Company (HNCP), the HNCP
argued in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. that the
calculations used by the FPC did not properly account for the HNCP’s fixed
costs and operating costs because the FPC’s calculations used an
accelerated depreciation schedule.40 In its holding, the Court expanded upon
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. and held that the FPC is not required to use any
particular formula in setting rates.41 Rather, it is only required to ensure that
the result of its rate setting is just and reasonable.42 Moreover, courts should
defer to the agency’s determination of just and reasonableness, which
thereby creates a heavy burden for those challenging the FPC’s
ratemaking.43
Subsequently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, the FPC obtained
regulatory authority to set rates for natural gas sales that occurred in-state,
if that natural gas was bound for transmission and resale outside state
34. Id. at 578-79.
35. Id. at 583.
36. Id. at 584.
37. Id.
38. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456.
39. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 584.
40. 320 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1944).
41. Id. at 602.
42. Id.
43. Id. (“[T]he Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact that it
is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity.
And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its
consequences.”).
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lines.44 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin is interesting because the FPC
initially determined that an independent producer of natural gas did not fall
within the FPC’s ratemaking jurisdiction under the NGA, because the sale
of natural gas occurred only as part of the production and gathering of
natural gas—activities which the FPC's jurisdiction does not encompass
under the NGA.45 However, the Supreme Court reasoned that if these sales
were not subject to federal regulation, then they must be regulated by the
state, which would create an unworkable patchwork of state-by-state
regulation—something the NGA expressly sought to eliminate.46 The Court
also seemed concerned with the fact that Phillips Petroleum Company
produced over 50% of the gas purchased by other companies at the point of
sale.47 Given the fact that the FPC found that it did not have jurisdiction
over Phillips’ activities, an underlying issue in this holding is the Court’s
concern over creating an institutionalized energy black market where
federal jurisdiction could not reach.
The result of these holdings is that federal regulatory authority over
energy markets is exclusive with regards to energy sales in interstate
commerce, even if this regulatory authority significantly affects, or even
negatively affects, the regulated energy producers. Moreover, this
regulatory authority attaches even before the energy crosses state lines as
long as the energy is bound for interstate commerce. Although these
holdings may seem obvious to scholars today, it is important to note that
this regulatory regime was developed in the years following the Great
Depression, during World War II, and the Cold War, when national
interests required strong federal oversight to ensure a stable market and
economy. Energy regulation during this period is almost inherently viewed
as an economic endeavor. Although this is still true today, the outlook
concerning energy regulation broadened in the 1970s to include a national
security component as well.
As it relates to the field of Indian law, the synthesis of these holdings
underscores the fact that Congress and the Supreme Court seem to be in
agreement that state authority is inadequate to provide a stable regulatory
regime in the areas of energy law and Indian law. In the series of cases
known as the “Marshall Trilogy,” for instance, the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for congressional plenary power over Indian affairs by holding
that Indian tribal governments have legitimate jurisdictional authority over
44.
45.
46.
47.

347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 675.
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tribal matters arising on tribal lands, but that tribal reservations are neither
above nor co-equal with states—rather, the relationship between Indians
and Indian reservations to the United States federal government is one of
hierarchy.48 Indian tribal governments are independent, but only insofar as
Congress allows them to be.49 Once Congress chooses to redefine this
relationship (either for the better or the worse from the Indians’
perspective), then it can exercise its plenary power even against the Indians’
wishes.50 Indians can invoke the trust relationship as a shield to undesirable
action, but success in this regard requires the Supreme Court to hold that
the tribes have a greater interest in the trust relationship than Congress has
in its plenary power.
B. Energy Regulation in the Modern Era
The most dramatic shift in national energy policy came in 1973 in the
wake of an oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). In response to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East,
OPEC nations undertook two concurrent courses of action to pressure the
United States and its allies to withdraw their support from Israel in the Yom
Kippur War.51 First, OPEC nations mutually agreed to a 5% reduction in
their oil production in order to inflate the price per barrel of oil in the world
market.52 Second, OPEC instituted a series of embargoes on the United
States and other Western nations who supported the United States or
Israel.53 Because the United States was highly dependent upon foreign oil,
the embargo thrust the United States into a state of crisis both economically
and geopolitically.54 In addition to short-term solutions55 the United States
48. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
49. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
50. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-77 (1823) (discussing federal
authority over Indians through the doctrines of discovery and conquest).
51. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 586-89
(1993).
52. Id. at 607.
53. Id. at 607-08.
54. Id. at 606-09.
55. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat.
627, compelled President Nixon to promulgate regulations to control the price of petroleum.
See id. § 2(b), 87 Stat. at 628. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-163, 89 Stat. 871, created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which has the capacity to hold
as much as 713.5 million barrels of oil. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
https://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve (last visited
Apr. 21, 2017).
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also undertook long-term policy shifts, which included energy efficiency
measures, fuel economy standards, and a ban on U.S. oil exports.56
The most significant effect of the embargo was the large-scale
reorganization of U.S. energy agencies and policies. First, Congress passed
the Federal Energy Administration Act of 197457 which created the Federal
Energy Administration (FEA). The FEA was created to “promote the
expansion of readily usable energy sources, and to assist in developing
policies and plans to meet the energy needs of the Nation.”58 However, the
FEA was superseded by the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977 with the
passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act.59 The Department
of Energy Act reorganized and consolidated the FEA and the FPC into the
new DOE.60 The Department of Energy Act also created two independent
sub-agencies within the DOE: the Energy Information Administration
(EIA), which is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
energy data and information,61 and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC),62 which assumed the powers vested in the FPC to
regulate interstate energy sales and set rates for wholesale energy sales.63
The last significant statute in response to the OPEC oil embargo was the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).64 PURPA was
enacted to promote energy conservation and efficiency, and to promote
domestic energy production. 65 PURPA expanded the FERC’s authority to
include not just large-scale public utilities, but also small-scale “qualifying
facilities”66 that traditionally faced discriminatory treatment in their energy
sales to the grid. PURPA represents a small but significant shift in national
energy policy away from a bigger-is-better model toward a recognition that
small and distributed energy generating units (EGUs) can fill a niche in the
national energy policy to both increase availability and reliability of energy,
and to help depress energy prices, especially in underserved markets with
low access to energy. Prior to PURPA’s enactment, utilities were scaling
back their development of large EGUs because the OPEC oil embargo
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

89 Stat. 871.
Pub. L. No. 93–275, 88 Stat. 96.
Id. § 2, 88 Stat. at 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 761(a) (2012)).
Pub. L. No. 95–91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
Id. § 301, 91 Stat. at 577-78 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012)).
Id. § 205, 91 Stat. at 572 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7135(a)).
Id. § 401, 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a)).
See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
Id. § 2, 92 Stat. at 3119.
Id. § 201, 92 Stat. at 3134.
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drove the costs of fuel higher, which not only affected the economics of
energy sales, but also inflated the costs of expanding and maintaining EGUs
and transmission lines.67 PURPA addressed this by requiring “wheeling”68
by transmission operators so that the small-scale EGUs could enter the
market.69 This was intended to achieve two results: (1) eliminate
discriminatory pricing by transmission providers who gave preference to
large-scale EGUs over small-scale EGUs to achieve the ultimate goal of
increasing competition in an effort to decrease prices paid by consumers,
and (2) alleviate bottlenecks which hindered energy transmission over the
grid.70
Eventually, as larger numbers of people became connected to long-range
interstate electrical grids, U.S. energy policy developed to regulate the
transmission of energy itself in addition to the extraction and transportation
of energy-generating commodities. It was not until a geopolitically
manufactured energy crisis in the 1970s that the United States began to
regulate energy usage through mechanisms such as mandated energy
efficiency measures. Increases in energy use, coupled with increases in
energy efficiency, have allowed large segments of the population to become
connected to the electrical grid—arguably one of the greatest national
achievements of the last century. However, energy policy in the United
States still generally focuses on large-scale development of centralized
power stations connected to interstate transmission lines.71 The trouble with
this model is that it favors fossil fuel development, which generally is
falling out of favor among a majority of U.S. citizens.72 Moreover, this
67. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 223-24 n.12 (1983).
68. “Wheeling” is the transfer of electrical power through transmission and distribution
lines from a small-scale qualifying facility to a utility. Wheeling, INDEP. ENERGY PRODUCERS
ASS’N, http://www.iepa.com/wheeling.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). Wheeling is designed
to move the least-cost power to consumers in order to keep costs low. Id.
69. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, §§ 203-204, 92 Stat. at 3136-40.
70. Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the
Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1004-05 (1998) (discussing PURPA’s wheeling
requirement at the marginal cost rate of transmitting utilities).
71. See Frequently Asked Questions: What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy
Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3
(last visited July 30, 2017) (stating that 85% of U.S. electricity is generated by utility-scale
facilities).
72. See Meg Handley, Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly Support Alternative Energy,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2013/04/01/poll-americans-overwhelmingly-support-alternative-energy; Brendan Moore &
Stafford Nichols, Americans Still Favor Energy Conservation over Production, GALLUP
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model is woefully inadequate to address large areas of Indian Country,
which have no access to the national electrical grid.73
The field of energy law can no longer be defined in terms of resource
extraction and energy generation alone. Rather, the future of energy law
must address a unique nexus between commodity and commerce law, along
with environmental and human rights law. Just as the United States has
transitioned from a renewable energy economy in the late 1700s and early
1800s to a fossil fuel economy in the mid-1800s, the United States is now
refocusing on renewable energy as a vital component of its overall energy
policy.74 This focus is largely a reaction to the negative effects of climate
change, as well as a slow realization that energy security is a national
security issue,75 not just an economic security issue. The effects this
realization will have on renewable energy development and grid
connectivity in Indian Country remains to be seen. However, there are
promising signs that Congress understands the renewable energy
development opportunities in Indian Country, and is willing to work with
tribes to promote such development in ways that are mutually beneficial to
both the tribes and the United States’ population as a whole.76
C. Modern Energy Policy, and Its Effect on Renewable Energy
Development in Indian Country
Providing energy access to rural and isolated areas of Indian Country via
power lines is prohibitively expensive77 when considering the small number
of citizens who would benefit from this investment. As such, the traditional
energy model of a large centralized power production facility connected to
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168176/americans-favor-energy-conservationproduction.aspx; Jeff McMahon, Americans Want America to Run on Solar and Wind,
FORBES (Jan. 1, 2015, 9:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/01/01/
americans-want-america-to-run-on-solar-and-wind/#6c606a1b3699; Zac Auter, In U.S., 73%
Now Prioritize Alternative Energy over Oil, Gas, GALLUP (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/190268/prioritize-alternative-energy-oil-gas.aspx.
73. Laurie Guevara-Stone, How Some Native Americans Are Embracing Renewable
Energy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/
Energy-Voices/2014/0701/How-some-Native-Americans-are-embracing-renewable-energy.
74. See supra note 9.
75. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGIC SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE PLAN: FY 2012,
at ES-1 (2012), http://perma.cc/E8QS-KVJ6.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See, e.g., PETER MEISEN, GLOB. ENERGY NETWORK INST., RENEWABLE ENERGY ON
TRIBAL LANDS 7 (2009) http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-ontribal-lands/Renewable-Energy-on-Tribal-Lands.pdf (“[P]ower lines . . . can cost approximately $60,000 per mile in mountainous terrain.”).
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homes through long transmission lines and localized distribution centers is
not well suited for the geographic and economic realities of rural Indian
Country.
One alternative to increase access to energy in rural and isolated areas of
Indian Country is to utilize renewable energy technologies that can be both
scalable with regards to utility-sized facilities (i.e., built in parts over time
as demand rises in order to keep costs low), as well as distributed with
regards to household-sized technologies (i.e., the technology used is not
necessarily connected to the grid, but is instead intended to provide energy
to the end-user who owns the technology). In many ways, renewable energy
development is particularly well-suited for Indian Country since Indian
Country “contains an estimated 5% of all renewable energy resources” in
the United States, including 14 billion MWh of solar resources and 1100
million MWh of wind resources.78 The presence of such abundant
renewable energy resources begs the question of why access to energy in
Indian Country is so low. The answer to this question requires a two-part
analysis. The first section of this part will discuss the continuing effects
from the Allotment era, including the effects of court holdings which
diminish tribal sovereignty over rights-of-way through Indian Country. The
second section will discuss current renewable energy economic incentives,
including state-driven policies, utility rebate programs, and federal tax
incentives for renewable energy development.
1. The Continuing Effects of Allotment on Rights-of-Way Over Indian
Country
Transmitting energy across the United States is a legally complex task.
Although states retain regulatory authority over transmission siting and
retail sales within their borders, federal regulators have regulatory authority
over interstate transmission, as well as over wholesale rates.79 In Indian
Country, state regulatory authority often applies only minimally, if at all,
since tribes retain sovereignty and jurisdiction over their own lands.80
78. OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DEVELOPING CLEAN ENERGY
PROJECTS ON TRIBAL LANDS: DATA AND RESOURCES FOR TRIBES 3 (Dec. 2012).
79. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION STUDY 5-8 (2011),
https://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/utility/puc_study_march2011.pdf (providing an overview of
the core responsibilities and basic structure of the major regulatory agencies overseeing the
electric sector).
80. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (“The Cherokee Nation . . .
[occupies] its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force . . . .”). But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001)
(“Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state
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However, tribal sovereignty is not absolute, and must yield to federal
oversight with regards to lands held in trust by the federal government.81 An
additional layer of complexity exists regarding tribal grants of rights-ofway (ROWs) through Indian Country due to the fact that the ROW may not
just involve tribally owned land or land held in fee simple by individual
Indians, but may also involve Indian Country land that is owned in fee
simple by non-Indians or non-tribal members due to the federal Indian
policy known as allotment.
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act.82 The Act divided
reservation land into 160-acre plots that were distributed to the heads of
each family, but held in trust, tax-free, by the government for a period of
twenty-five years.83 At the end of this period, the title would be conveyed to
the family head in fee simple and subject to state taxation.84 Any remaining
reservation land was then parceled and sold to non-Indian settlers.85 The
proceeds from these sales were given to the Indian tribe.86
Although the goal of allotment was intended to assimilate Indians by
discouraging tribalism and encouraging capitalism through privately owned
farms, the detrimental effects of allotment have been long-lasting for both
individual Indians and tribal governments. Many individual Indians lost
their allotted land after the twenty-five-year period because they could not
afford the tax payments.87 As these parcels were conveyed to non-Indian
farmers through forced sales, the remaining Indian landowners could not
compete financially with non-Indian farmers whose farms grew through
consolidated land purchases.88 Many of these Indians were forced to sell
their land under terms and at prices that were financially detrimental.89

regulatory authority on the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's
border.”).
81. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(4), at 418-23 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the federal trust doctrine).
82. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (also
known as the Dawes Act). Senator Henry Laurens Dawes (R-Mass.), chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, authored and sponsored the bill.
83. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1995)
(“[M]any [Indians] lost their lands at sheriffs' sales for nonpayment of taxes or other liens.”).
88. Id. at 12-13
89. Id. at 12.
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Tribal governments continue to struggle with the effects of allotment
today. Because of these forced sales, non-tribal members hold many parcels
of land within the boundaries of Indian reservations in fee simple. 90 This
raises complex jurisdictional questions as to whether the tribe, the state, or
the federal government has jurisdiction over certain issues in Indian
Country. The best that can be said of these dynamics is that jurisdiction in
Indian law cases often depends not only on where the controversy occurs,
but also on who the parties are and their relationship to each other.91
The “checker boarding” of land ownership and jurisdiction throughout
Indian Country has direct effects on Indian development, especially with
regards to the development of Indian energy resources. Determining who
has the right to the energy resource, what state or federal agency has
regulatory authority, and how development subsidies (if any) should be
applied adds significant hurdles—both economic and jurisdictional—to the
development of energy resources. This is especially true of renewable
energy resources due to the complexities it adds with regards to ROWs over
Indian Country.
The regulatory background concerning ROWs over Indian Country is
more favorable to Indians today than it has historically been. Prior to 1899,
Congress authorized ROWs by enacting a specific statute for each
individual ROW.92 During this time, Congress generally required the entity
seeking the ROW over Indian Country to pay just compensation at a cost
determined by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).93 The trouble with
this model, aside from being extremely inefficient, was that the Secretary
was not always required to consult with the tribe as to its wishes regarding a
ROW.94 This changed when Congress passed the Indian Right-of-Way Act
of 1948, which allowed the Secretary to grant ROWs over Indian Country

90. See Jurisdictional Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th
Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs) (stating that twenty-seven tribes in the Seattle area have more land owned by
non-Indians within tribal reservation boundaries than owned by tribal members).
91. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 81, § 7.02 (discussing
tribal jurisdiction).
92. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005,
SECTION 1813 INDIAN LAND RIGHTS-OF-WAY STUDY 30 (2007), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/EPAct_1813_Final.pdf [hereinafter ENERGY POLICY ACT
STUDY].
93. Id.
94. Id.
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for any company that complied with the terms of the authorizing statute.95
The Secretary had already obtained the general authority to grant ROWs
over Indian Country through a series of previously enacted statutes.96
However, none of these statutes required tribal consultation or consent. The
Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948 made consultation and consent
obligatory, as well as streamlined the ROW process by stipulating the
actions a company must take to obtain a ROW, thereby removing much of
the discretionary nature of this duty from the Secretary.97
Although it may be tempting to assume that tribes typically take a “not in
my backyard” approach to transmission infrastructure and ROWs in Indian
Country, this is not necessarily true.98 In some instances, tribes may be
eager to negotiate ROWs through their reservations because they see this as
a lucrative revenue stream.99 However, the issue of cost valuation may
drive-up the costs of ROWs over Indian Country, or may deter tribal
governments from granting ROWs altogether due to differing valuation
calculations between tribal governments and ROW seekers.
In general, payment for ROWs can either be on a per unit of usage basis
(i.e., per square foot or per acre), or by an objective appraisal of the affected

95. Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-407, 62 Stat. 17 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 323–328).
96. See General Rights-of-Way, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990, 990 (1899) (“[A] right of way . . .
for a railway, telegraph and telephone line through any Indian reservation in any State or
Territory. . . is hereby granted to any railroad company organized under the laws of the
United States . . . .“); 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized
and empowered to grant a right-of-way in the nature of an easement for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of pipe lines for the conveyance of oil and gas through any
Indian reservation . . . .”); 43 U.S.C.A. § 961 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22)
(“[T]he head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands be, and he hereby is,
authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to grant an
easement for rights-of-way . . . for electrical poles and lines for the transmission and
distribution of electrical power, and for poles and lines for communication purposes . . . .”).
97. 25 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (“No grant of a right-of-way over and across any lands
belonging to a tribe organized under [the Indian Reorganization Act et al.] shall be made
without the consent of the proper tribal officials.”).
98. See Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437,
466 (2010) (arguing that the stereotype that Indians are inherently environmentalists is a
“mental shortcut” that may be “grounded on some element of truth,” but that does not
necessarily hold true for all tribes).
99. See generally James C. Powers, Will Rights of Way Across Indian Land Drive Up the
Cost of Energy?, RIGHT OF WAY MAG., Mar./Apr. 2006, https://www.irwaonline.org/
eweb/upload/ROW%20Archives%207-05%20thru%207-06/306/indianland.pdf (warning that
Indian tribes’ negotiations regarding rights-of-way may drive up energy prices).
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land’s worth.100 Although the per unit calculation seems to be more
objective, the trouble with this calculation is that determining the value of a
unit of land isolated from its larger parcel may be difficult. For instance, the
ROW seeker may prefer to calculate the value of the unit at its predevelopment or current use value, whereas the tribe may prefer to calculate
the value of the unit at its post-development value since this development
will likely alter the value of the surrounding parcel. The appraisal method is
equally troublesome because the tribe may prefer to appraise the land as if
the entire ROW were one continuous parcel since this appraisal
methodology more appropriately captures the value of the entire project.
However, the ROW seeker may prefer to appraise the land on a parcel-toparcel basis, since this valuation methodology is more likely to result in a
lower price paid to each individual landowner.
Currently, there is no standard value calculation for ROWs over Indian
Country. Rather, each ROW is granted based on negotiations between the
ROW seeker and the tribal government or landowner.101 Tribes argue that a
standard value calculation could not account for the value of things like
tribal history, culture, or oral traditions that are tied to tribal lands.102
Moreover, certain areas of tribal lands may be specific to certain tribal
practices, or may be the only area where certain biota necessary for
religious practices can be found.103 ROWs seekers, however, argue that
market-based valuations should apply to tribal lands because allowing a
tribe to negotiate a ROW under its own terms drives costs to the highest
point that the ROW seeker must bear.104 ROW seekers argue that this
inflates the price of energy by imposing those negotiating costs on
consumers.105
Tribal governments may be justifiably concerned about granting ROWs
through Indian Country without obtaining adequate compensation because
ROWs may impede upon the tribe’s inherent sovereignty or tribal
jurisdiction.106 Although tribes generally have civil jurisdiction over events
100. See ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 55-74 (section 9, summarizing
various compensation arrangements for rights of way in Indian Country).
101. Id. at 30.
102. Id. at 30-31.
103. Id. at 31.
104. Id. at 29-30.
105. Id. at 39.
106. See Comments of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe on the Department of Energy
Section 1813 Right-of-Way Study, TRIBAL ENERGY & ENVTL. INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, ¶ 6 (Apr.
18, 2006), http://teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/transmission/case/1813/docs/may2006/Comments_
Right_of_Way_Study_Res_%20No_166_06_CR.pdf (“No right of way or other business
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occurring in Indian Country,107 “including rights-of-way running through
the reservation,”108 courts have not always agreed that tribal jurisdiction
exists where ROWs grant access to non-Indians or non-Indian interests.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, a case involving a car accident between two
non-Indians on a state highway in Indian Country, the Supreme Court held
that tribal civil jurisdiction did not extend to disputes between two nonIndians, even though the dispute arose from an incident that took place
wholly in Indian Country on land owned in fee simple by the Three
Affiliated Tribes.109 This holding is based on three points of reasoning.
First, the Court reasoned that both of the conditions under 25 U.S.C. §§
324-325 requiring consent of tribal officials and a payment of just
compensation were fully met;110 therefore, the Tribe invited non-tribal
members onto its reservation by granting a proper ROW. Second, the Court
noted that a federally granted ROW provided for the state highway on
which the accident occurred.111 Since the purpose of the highway was to
bring non-tribal members onto the Indian land and the highway was
maintained by the state, the Tribe had no jurisdiction over non-member
disputes arising from accidents thereon, even though the Tribe owned the
land providing for the ROW.112 Finally, the Court noted that when granting
the ROW, the Tribe reserved its rights to construct crossings over the
ROW, and that these crossings were to be maintained by individual
landowners whose land abutted the crossings.113 Since the Tribe reserved
these rights when the ROW was granted, but did not reserve any tribal
jurisdiction over the ROW, then the Tribe ceded jurisdictional control over
disputes arising from events occurring on the ROW.114
Although 25 U.S.C. § 324 requires consent of tribal officials and just
compensation to obtain a proper ROW over Indian land owned in fee
simple, the DOI may grant ROWs over lands held in trust for Indian tribes.
In Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana Power Co., a case involving a natural
gas pipeline that ran across Indian land held in trust, the Blackfeet Tribe
arrangement that allows non-tribal entities or persons to use tribal land should reduce the
jurisdiction of the Tribe over its land or over persons and activities occurring on such lands.”).
107. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
109. 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
110. Id. at 454-55.
111. Id. at 442.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 455.
114. Id.
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objected to a fifty-year lease issued by the Secretary for a pipeline ROW.115
The Blackfeet Tribe argued that the Secretary’s authority under 25 U.S.C. §
321 only permitted twenty-year lease terms for pipelines.116 The Ninth
Circuit held that while § 321 only permitted twenty-year lease terms for
pipelines, the Secretary had authority to issue fifty-year leases under 25
U.S.C. § 323.117 Therefore, the Secretary was authorized to issue either
twenty or fifty-year leases as he saw fit.118
Although placing land in trust gives the Secretary the authority to grant
ROWs, it protects the land from condemnation by state public utilities. In
Nebraska Public Power District v. 100.95 Acres of Land, a case involving
the authority of a public utility to condemn tracts of land held in trust by the
United States for individual Indians and Indian tribes, the Eighth Circuit
held that the utility had the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 357 to condemn
allotted land held by Indians, but that § 357 does not authorize such
authority regarding land held in trust for the Indians.119 Section 357 states
that “[l]ands allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any
public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the
same manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money
awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee.”120
The importance of these three holdings to energy development in Indian
Country cannot be overstated because these holdings create a scenario
where grants of ROWs through Indian Country imply a diminishment of
tribal jurisdiction unless a tribe affirmatively reserves its jurisdiction in its
ROW agreement. However, even if the tribe reserves its jurisdiction or
refuses a ROW altogether, the land could still be condemned under state
law as authorized by 25 U.S.C. § 357.121 Condemnation would overcome
any reservation of tribal jurisdiction, but the mere possibility of
condemnation may discourage Indians from negotiating too strongly in
ROW agreements for fear that the ROW seeker will seek condemnation
rather than a ROW agreement. If tribes or individual landowners choose,
they can place fee simple land in trust with the federal government so that
115. 838 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
116. Id.
117. Section 323 states that the Secretary of the Interior “is empowered to grant rights-ofway for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he may prescribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 323
(2012).
118. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d at 1059.
119. 719 F.2d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 1983).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (2012).
121. Id.
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the federal trust obligation overcomes state condemnation. The Secretary
then has the authority to issue ROWs under 25 U.S.C. § 323. Although the
Secretary is required to act as trustee and consult with the tribe in ROW
decisions, the fact that the ROW decision-making power is placed in a nontribal entity implies a diminishment of sovereignty, especially since the
Secretary is only required to adhere to the landowner’s wishes “to the
maximum extent possible,” but may not “unreasonably withhold [the] grant
of a right-of-way.”122
Even in light of these holdings, there may be greater opportunities to the
tribe in ROW negotiations than tribal governments are utilizing. The most
critical aspect of ROWs negotiations is their non-standard nature. There is
no statute or regulation mandating that ROW seekers must use, or that
tribes must consent to, market-based appraisals or valuations for ROWs.
Tribes have correctly asserted that the freedom to negotiate is a function of
their inherent sovereignty, and some tribes have not focused on maximizing
payments for ROWs, but rather on utilizing more creative solutions. For
instance, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
accepted a $25,000 contribution to its scholarship fund in addition to
monetary compensation for a natural gas pipeline ROW over its
reservation.123 Rather than a one-time payment for the ROW itself, the
Southern Ute tribe accepted a $15-per-rod124 donation to its tribal
scholarship fund. Along with that donation, Southern Ute accepted various
investment and joint-venture business opportunities from the MidAmerican Pipeline Company in exchange for a ROW for a liquefied natural
gas pipeline spanning over seven miles of tribal land.125 In total, the
scholarship payment reached approximately $50,000.126
While remaining mindful of both the practical and the symbolic
importance of sovereignty to Indian tribes, criticism is both warranted and
appropriate if tribes forego energy development out of fear that ROWs
required for that development may put their inherent sovereignty at risk. As
discussed above, lack of access to energy in Indian Country is a significant
impediment to income security, educational and employment opportunities,
and the overall health and well-being of tribal members.127 To the extent
that tribes are concerned about threats to their sovereignty or jurisdiction
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

25 C.F.R. § 169.124(b)-(c) (2016).
ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 57.
One rod is equal to five feet, six inches.
ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 58.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
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stemming from ROWs over Indian Country, there is a federal work-around
that respects tribal sovereignty while simultaneously protecting Indian trust
land from condemnation.128
2. State-Driven Renewable Energy Development
Although ROWs are necessary to provide grid-connected energy to
Indian Country, the above discussion overlooks the fact that some areas of
Indian Country either already have grid connectivity, or are geographically
close enough to grid-connected areas to obtain grid connectivity without
extensive new ROWs.129 Viewing grid-connected areas as separate from the
problem of non-grid areas ignores two key facts. First, even though
residents in grid-connected areas may have adequate access to energy, they
might lack the economic resources to fully take advantage of this access.130
Moreover, because of the exorbitant costs of extending the grid131 (which
includes the costs associated with obtaining ROWs), even geographic
proximity to grid-connected areas does not necessarily translate to gridconnectivity per se.132 Second, viewing grid-connected areas as separate
from non-grid areas considers access to energy in Indian Country as a
geographic issue rather than a broader socioeconomic tribal issue.133
A series of tax and utility rebate incentives encourage renewable energy
development in the United States by decreasing the costs of investment,
development, and operation over time. Utility-scale renewable energy
development is largely driven by Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs),
which are state programs that encourage or require utilities operating within
the state to obtain a certain amount of their energy from renewable

128. See infra Part III.
129. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to areas with grid connectivity and
areas capable of obtaining grid connectivity as “grid-connected” areas. Isolated areas
without grid connectivity will be referred to as non-grid areas.
130. See generally PATRICK SABOL, FROM POWER TO EMPOWERMENT: PLUGGING LOW
INCOME COMMUNITIES INTO THE CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 1-2 (2016), https://grounds
well.org/frompower_to_empowerment_wp.pdf (discussing the reasons why for poor
Americans’ energy bills are higher than wealthy Americans’ and how these costs can
snowball into unmanageable debt).
131. See MEISEN, supra note 77, at 7.
132. See id. at 19 (stating that higher energy costs on reservations hinders access to
energy).
133. See generally id.
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sources.134 Typically, RPSs operate on a yearly basis where the renewable
energy target is raised over time to encourage development of renewable
energy generating units (REGUs). The RPSs vary widely from state-tostate.135 While some states make their RPSs mandatory and issue penalties
for failure to comply, other states treat their RPSs as voluntary.136
Utilities comply with the RPSs by obtaining renewable energy credits
(RECs) for every unit of renewable energy they sell.137 States, however,
define renewable energy sources differently. Thus, some states value solar
energy more highly than wind energy, or classify waste-to-energy facilities
as renewable energy sources whereas other states do not. For instance,
Connecticut’s RPS program requires utilities by 2020 to generate 20% of
their electricity from “Class I” facilities which exclude “trash-to-energy”
facilities.138 By contrast, Maryland’s RPS requires 25% energy generation
from “Tier 1 Renewable Sources” by 2020, which includes “waste-toenergy” facilities.139 Consequently, prices vary widely between state REC
markets and resource types.140
Additionally, some states require the RECs to be “bundled” to the unit of
renewable energy, while other states allow the RECs to be “unbundled”
from the unit of renewable energy.141 Bundled RECs encourage renewable
134. MEREDITH WINGATE ET AL., COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FOSTERING
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN NORTH AMERICA 11-12 (2007), https://www.conser
vationgateway.org/Documents/Fostering-RE-MarketsinNA-en.pdf.
135. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92 (2015) (requiring 40% of each electric utility
company’s net electricity sales to be from renewable sources by December 31, 2030), with
IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-37-12 (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring that 10% of utility energy sales
come from renewable energy sources to qualify for the financial incentives set out in the
state’s renewable portfolio standard).
136. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb.
3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850.
137. Renewable Energy Standards, SEIA: SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://
www.seia.org/policy/renewable-energy-deployment/renewable-energy-standards (last visited
Aug. 24, 2017).
138. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/
program/detail/1085http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/195 (last visited Aug.
3, 2017).
139. Id.
140. Brook Detterman et al., United States, in ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE REGULATION
194, 199 (Carlos de Miguel Perales et al. eds., 2015) (“According to the DOE’s Green
Power Network, REC prices range from about US$1 (in Texas and Washington, DC) to
about US$50 (in Massachusetts and several other states) [and] Solar RECs (SRECs) range
from about US$50 to a high of nearly US$500.”).
141. U.S. P’SHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., RAMPING UP RENEWABLES: LEVERAGING
STATE RPS PROGRAMS AMID UNCERTAIN FEDERAL SUPPORT 25 (2012), http://uspref.org/wp-
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energy generation close to the source of the energy usage, whereas
unbundled RECs can be traded across state lines.142 Bundled RECs are
preferable for states that want to encourage in-state development of REGUs
whereas unbundled RECs are ideal for states where energy usage is much
lower than energy supply.143
Financial incentives for retail customers take the form of net metering or
feed-in tariffs. Net metering and feed-in tariffs allow retail customers with
small-scale grid-connected REGUs to sell the energy they generate to their
utility.144 Although the programs are similar, there are slight differences
between the two.
Net metering, which is required under PURPA, allows a customer to sell
the energy they generate to their utility at the retail price the customer
would otherwise pay.145 In essence, net metering allows customers’ gridconnected meters to flow backwards so that customers can either deduct the
energy they generate from their utility bill, or credit this energy to future
bills. Feed-in tariffs, however, require a pre-arranged purchase agreement
with customers’ utilities which guarantee that the utility will purchase any
energy generated by the customer at a price above the retail rate. 146
Although feed-in tariffs are financially ideal for customers because they
guarantee a return on investment, only five states require feed-in tariffs, and
only a small handful of utilities provide feed-in tariffs.147
The trouble with net metering and feed-in tariffs, as they relate to Indian
Country, is that both programs require grid connectivity in order to take
advantage of the financial incentive of small-scale REGUs. As such, these
programs provide no benefit to non-grid areas of Indian Country. In
addition to net metering and feed-in tariffs, there are two federal tax

content/uploads/2012/06/Ramping-up-Renewables-Leveraging-State-RPS-Programs-amidUncertain-Federal-Support-US-PREF-White-Paper1.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Cf. id.
144. Although net metering and feed-in tariffs can apply to energy generated from wind
turbines as well as photovoltaic solar cells, most net metering and feed-in tariffs involve
energy generated from photovoltaic solar cells since these are easy to deploy on residential
and commercial rooftops as compared to the space required for a small-scale wind turbine.
145. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11) (2012).
146. Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detail.cfm?id=11471.
147. Feed-in Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 4, 2013),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.php.
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incentives for REGUs known as the Investment Tax Credit (ITC)148 and the
Production Tax Credit (PTC)149 that provide additional incentives to
develop REGUs. Like net metering and feed-in tariffs, the ITC and the PTC
are similar, with some key differences.
The ITC provides a phased-down rebate schedule whereby any
individual or entity that pays federal income tax receives a 30% cost credit
on their federal income tax for every dollar of investment they make in
renewable energy projects once those projects come online.150 For solar
projects, the 30% cost credit applies every year until 2019 as long as the
solar cell has no less than a 500-watt capacity, and a 30% efficiency rate.151
The credit drops to 26% in 2020, 22% in 2021, and 10% thereafter.152
Investments in qualifying wind projects receive a 30% cost credit in 2016
as long as the turbine has a minimum 100 kW capacity. 153 This credit drops
to 24% in 2017, 18% in 2018, and 12% in 2019.154
The PTC provides a tax credit of $0.023/kWh for qualifying wind
facilities and a credit of $0.012/kWh for other eligible REGUs, including
solar cells.155 The credit is reduced by 20% in 2017, 40% in 2018, and 60%
in 2019.156
With regards to encouraging REGU development in Indian Country, the
PTC and the ITC suffer from several significant problems. First, because
tribal governments are sovereign entities, they are not subject to federal
taxation, and therefore do not qualify for federal tax breaks. Thus, any
renewable energy project owned by the tribal government does not qualify
for either the PTC or the ITC. Second, the PTC requires grid-connectivity
since the credit only applies once the energy is “sold by the taxpayer to an
unrelated person during the taxable year.”157 As such, the PTC does not
incentivize REGU development in non-grid areas of Indian Country. Third,
the PTC requires that the person or entity receiving the tax benefit owns the

148. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22).
149. Id. § 45.
150. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.
gov/savings/business-energy-investment-tax-credit-itc (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.
gov/savings/renewable-electricity-production-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
156. Id.
157. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22).
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REGU, a dilemma that will be discussed below in Part III. 158 Fourth, both
programs require the taxpayer to have the capital upfront to spend on the
REGU, or to have access to cost-effective financing to fund the REGU
development.159 Due to economies of scale, this may be less of an issue for
utility-scale REGUs than it is for small-scale, distributed REGUs in nongrid areas.160
The incentives discussed above provide ample economic opportunities to
individual Indian landowners in grid-connected areas since these
landowners can utilize any of the tax or rebate programs to offset the costs
of renewable energy development on their fee simple land. These
opportunities are dependent upon the Indians’ ability to fund the upfront
costs of investing in REGUs, which may not be possible for many Indians,
even in grid-connected areas.161 Unfortunately, the economic incentives
discussed above do not appreciably improve access to energy in non-grid
areas of Indian Country since Indians in these areas must either pay for
their own REGUs and rely upon the ITC to deflate this cost, or must obtain
a REGU from an organization like the NativeSUN Hopi Solar Electric
Enterprise.162
Rather than relying on individual Indian landowners to pay for their own
distributed REGU technologies and take advantage of the tax and rebate
incentives to improve access to energy, tribal governments can develop
utility-scale renewable energy projects. Unlike individual landowners,
however, tribal governments will not be eligible for the PTC because tribal
governments are not subject to federal income tax.163 Although the inability
to claim federal renewable energy tax credits hinders tribal renewable
energy development, it is important to note that this, in and of itself, does
not put tribes at a disadvantage compared to other sovereigns since
158. Id. § 45(d).
159. See Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/barriersto-renewable-energy.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017).
160. Id. This same issue also affects grid-connected property owners who wish to take
advantage of the ITC, net metering, or feed-in tariff programs.
161. Notably, this problem is not indicative to Indian landowners. Purchasing and
deploying REGUs is a substantial cost that hinders REGU development throughout the
United States.
162. See infra Section IV.A.
163. Income Tax Guidelines FAQ #6 Answer: Are Federal Recognized Tribes Subject to
Income Taxes?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indiantribal-governments/itg-faq-6-answer-are-federally-recognized-tribes-subject-to-income-taxes
(last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
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renewable energy development is commonly undertaken by private
investors as opposed to being state-owned and operated.164 Thus, although
tribal governments cannot take advantage of the PTC or the ITC, neither
can state governments.
Needless to say, tax and rebate incentives are critically important to the
development of REGUs in the United States. These programs have driven
much of the renewable energy development that has occurred in the last
decade and will continue to be a driving force in making renewable energy
cost-competitive with fossil fuels. Unfortunately, those Indians in the
greatest need of expanded access to energy cannot afford the upfront
investment costs for the REGU technologies, so the tax and rebate
incentives are too little too late to benefit them. With an abundance of
renewable energy resources in Indian Country, combined with low access
to energy among Indian populations, the need for Indian-specific tax and
rebate programs is clear. These programs would not only be beneficial to
Indian populations, but non-Indian populations would also benefit from
renewable energy generation that does not increase pollution in the
biosphere. In essence, Indian-specific tax or rebate programs would not be a
windfall to Indians at the expense of non-Indians. Rather, such programs
would recognize the need for access to energy in Indian Country while at
the same time creating a positive benefit to non-Indians as well.
III. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A Solution Wrapped in a Problem
A. Introduction and Overview
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which, among
other things, contained provisions intended to promote energy extraction
and development in Indian Country.165 Title V of the EPAct is known as the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
(ITEDSA).166 Prior to the ITEDSA’s enactment, tribal energy development
projects were regulated under any number of statutes, such as the Indian
164. See Daniel Gross, Going Private: To Undertake a Massively Ambitious Energy
Project, You Don’t Need the Government Anymore, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/10/renewable_energy_projects_the_
private_sector_not_the_government_is_funding.htmlhttp://www.slate.com/articles/business/
moneybox/2014/10/renewable_energy_projects_the_private_sector_not_the_government_is
_funding.html (stating that private companies routinely back large-scale renewable energy
projects on their own).
165. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
166. Id. tit. V, 119 Stat. at 763-79.
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Mineral Leasing Act, or the Indian Mineral Development Act.167 There are
two main problems with this regulatory structure: (1) sometimes two or
more different statutes can regulate the same resource on tribal lands,
therefore, determining which statute is the most beneficial to the tribal
interests is costly, time consuming, and difficult; (2) regardless of the
statute the tribe chooses to invoke for regulating the resource development,
the tribes are required to seek development approval from the Secretary for
all projects on lands held in trust by the federal government.
The ITEDSA creates a mechanism through which tribes can escape DOI
oversight and enter into long-term leases or ROW agreements for energy
development under what is known as a Tribal Energy Resource Agreement
(TERA).168 However, the process of creating a TERA and gaining
Secretarial approval for projects under the TERA is, itself, costly, timeconsuming, and difficult.169 If the tribe meets certain statutory mandates,
then the Secretary is obligated to approve the TERA and release the tribe
from federal oversight regarding all actions under the TERA.170 In this
regard, TERAs are similar to other statutory mechanisms designed to
streamline or remove federal oversight.171
TERAs address two of the problems outlined in Section II.A of this
Article. First, by placing tribally owned land in trust, the state is precluded
from condemning land for ROWs, but the tribe is still able to retain full
control of issuing leases or ROWs over that land by entering into a TERA.
TERAs prohibit the Secretary from approving leases or ROWs that the tribe
does not agree with since the TERA grants the tribe lease-approving
authority for the TERA resource.172 Because TERAs are only projectspecific, however, the Secretary still retains authority to issue ROWs over
any trust land not subject to the TERA.173 To protect trust land from the
possibility of ROWs, a tribe must create a development project that affects
167. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
168. Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(e), 119 Stat. at 770-76.
169. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065,
1081-82 (2008) (discussing the process to obtain TERA approval).
170. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 770.
171. For instance, section 404 of the Clean Water Act allows states, under their delegated
authority, to issue general discharge permits rather than individual discharge permits that
must comply with substantive criteria and an individualized application. 33 U.S.C. §
1344(e)(1) (2012). The benefit of general permits is obvious—it decreases costs while
promoting the efficient development of projects.
172. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(a)-(b), 119 Stat. at 769-70.
173. 25 U.S.C. 323 (2012).
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that land and enter into a TERA for that project.174 Of course, this may run
counter to what the tribe actually wants to do with the land it places in trust;
perhaps a tribe may simply want to preserve the land as is. Therefore,
TERAs, while beneficial to development, are not roadblocks to all federal
oversight. For tribes that are focused on infrastructure development and
must seek Secretarial approval frequently, a TERA provides the tribe more
autonomy to pursue development in a self-actualizing manner.
Third, TERAs affirm tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction since it is the
tribal government that approves leases or ROWs for TERA projects rather
than the DOI.175 The tribe would still be required to affirmatively assert its
jurisdiction in the lease or ROW agreement with the non-tribal entity as per
Strate.176 But, a TERA removes the federal middle-man in tribal
development projects, at least insofar as the tribe assumes project oversight
after the TERA is approved. TERAs also affirm tribal sovereignty in that
the existence of a TERA may help a tribe assert its jurisdiction over
disputes arising from a TERA project. Because TERAs exist under the
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, TERAs are, by
their very nature, an affirmation of tribal self-governance and selfdetermination—an affirmation that the DOI has sanctioned and approved.
Because energy development is an inherently economic activity, the tribe
can argue that the DOI-approved TERA project is vital to the tribe’s
economic vitality, thereby requiring tribal jurisdiction.177
B. TERAs: The Solution
As a matter of federal policy toward Indians and Indian tribal
governments, TERAs represent Congress’ intent to shift away from
174. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 769.
175. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben Nighthorse
Campbell 1 (Apr. 8, 2003), in Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Aff., 118th Cong. 108 (2003), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG108shrg86005/pdf/CHRG-108shrg86005.pdf ("Generally speaking, the concept of turning
tribal resource management over to tribes while ‘eliminating' federal oversight would seem
to be a very simple infusion of sovereignty into the current statutory and regulatory scheme
governing tribal resource development. The Navajo Nation certainly supports this general
concept.").
176. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
177. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (“A tribe may [] retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

308

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

paternalistic tribal development statutes toward a broader affirmation of
tribal self-determination regarding Indian development projects. For
example, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) allows a tribe to enter
into leases with non-tribal entities for the extraction of minerals, as long as
the Secretary approves the lease.178 Additionally, the Indian Mineral
Development Act (IMDA) allows for both negotiated leases as under the
IMLA, as well as joint venture agreements with non-tribal entities, subject
also to Secretarial approval.179 The fact that federal paternalism permeates
all Indian energy development statutes is a problem not just because it
diminishes tribal sovereignty, but also because federal paternalism imposes
an additional and costly layer of bureaucracy onto tribal development
projects that often results in delays that cost tribal governments and nontribal investors time and money. In many ways, TERAs are an ideal
solution to this bureaucracy.180
One reason why TERAs are an ideal solution is that TERAs apply to all
energy resource development,181 whereas previous energy development
statutes are ambiguous as to whether or not they include development of
renewable energy resources.182 Also, the term lengths for leases under a
TERA are standardized at a maximum of thirty years for renewable
development and ten years for oil and gas development.183 These terms are
sufficiently lengthy for non-tribal developers to yield a return on
investment. Furthermore, since the tribe, rather than the DOI, retains the
right of renewal, TERAs encourage cooperation between the two parties,
rather than communication through DOI officials. Perhaps most
importantly, TERAs allow the tribe to assume an active role in energy
development on its own lands, rather than acting merely as a passive lessor
or seller.184 The ITEDSA regulations allow a tribe to enter into a “business
178. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2012).
179. Indian Mineral Development Act, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012)).
180. See Royster, supra note 1, at 117-19 (discussing four ways in which TERAs address
delays caused by the federal trust obligation).
181. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2015) (“Energy Resources means both renewable and
nonrenewable energy sources, including, but not limited to, natural gas, oil, uranium, coal,
nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydrologic resources.”).
182. Royster, supra note 1, at 97 (noting that the Indian Mineral Development Act
discusses oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, and other energy or non-energy
mineral resources (25 U.S.C. § 2102(a)), but that the statute does not clarify the breadth of
the “other energy or non-energy mineral resources”).
183. Id. at 117.
184. Id. at 118.
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agreement” for “any permit, contract, joint venture, option, or other
agreement that furthers any activity related to locating, producing,
transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land.”185 The breadth
of this definition allows a tribe to enter into nearly any joint venture with a
non-tribal entity as long as that joint venture is pursuant to energy
development on tribal land.
C. TERAs: The Problem
Although TERAs, in theory, provide a solution to the jurisdictional
issues affecting REGU development in Indian Country, in practice TERAs
may actually impede REGU development in Indian Country. Before a tribe
can enter into a TERA, the tribal government must meet the stringent
mandates described in 25 C.F.R. § 224.63 in order to qualify for a TERA.186
One of these mandates is a requirement that the tribe implement some type
of tribal “environmental review process.”187 The environmental review
process must identify all significant environmental effects of the project,
identify mitigation measures, provide a public notice and comment period,
and require a tribal response to substantive comments.188
Notably, the tribal environmental review process does not supplant the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).189 In fact, the environmental
review process may actually be more stringent than the NEPA in two
regards. First, many of the tribal environmental review requirements are
duplicative of the NEPA, essentially requiring the tribe to undergo some
parts of the NEPA process twice.190 Second, the NEPA and the tribal
environmental review process apply equally to the tribe and actually place
tribal sovereignty below state sovereignty in certain regards.191 For
instance, if a state chooses to approve a wind farm, the state is not required
185. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30(1) (2008).
186. 25 C.F.R. § 224.63 (2012).
187. Id. § 224.63(c).
188. Id. § 224.63(c)(1)-(4).
189. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(f)(1) (2012) (“Nothing in this section affects the application of . . .
any Federal environmental law.”).
190. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended "Great
Mischief for Indian Energy Development" and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 817 (2012) (discussing the aspects of the tribal environmental review
process that mirror NEPA).
191. Scot W. Anderson, The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination
Act of 2005: Opportunities for Cooperative Ventures 8-9 & n.36 (presentation at Special
Institute: Natural Resource Development in Indian Country, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute, Nov. 10-11, 2005), https://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/670412.pdf.
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to undergo a NEPA analysis unless there is some major federal action (i.e.,
federal grants, taking of endangered species, etc.). But, if a tribe chooses to
develop a wind farm on trust land under a TERA, the tribe is immediately
at a disadvantage compared to the state by triggering the NEPA by virtue of
requiring Secretarial approval. The tribe is also placed at a further
disadvantage by virtue of the tribal environmental review requirement
under a TERA.
The distinction between the tribal environmental review process under a
TERA and the Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) requirement under the NEPA is critical. The tribal
environmental review process is a review of the TERA project itself (i.e.,
the proposed wind farm).192 That review does not occur until after the
Secretary grants the TERA, but before development on the project can
commence.193 The NEPA analysis, on the other hand, is required for any
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”194 The NEPA is triggered during the approval process of the
TERA by the Secretary. Therefore, the NEPA would require the DOI to
conduct an EA or EIS in order for the Secretary to approve a TERA for a
tribe to develop its wind resources; but, a TERA requires a tribal
environmental review of the project itself. The tribe incurs the costs of the
TERA-required tribal environmental review process, and the DOI incurs the
costs associated with the NEPA analysis. But the tribe also incurs costs
associated with the NEPA analysis by virtue of having to wait for the EA or
EIS to be completed. The complexity and dual costs of the NEPA analysis
and the TERA-required tribal environmental review process exemplify one
of the most significant problems with TERAs: many tribes may not be able
to justify the cost-risk calculations and the cost-benefit returns of the TERA
process.195

192. See Royster, supra note 169, at 1090.
193. See id. at 1090-91 (“NEPA . . . applies to federal approvals of tribal resource
development leases and agreements.”).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
195. Royster, supra note 1, at 119-20 (“The front-end costs of time, money, and staffing
to develop a TERA and shepherd it through the approval process are substantial, if not
prohibitive. The back-end costs of providing an environmental review process and
addressing public input into tribal decisions and compliance are similarly substantial. These
costs mean that ITEDSA may ultimately be useful to only a small cadre of tribes with
considerable energy resources to develop. For a tribe seeking to place a few solar collectors
on tribal land or harvest forest residues as biomass, however, the TERA process may be
more of a barrier than an opportunity.”).
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The ITEDSA attempts to address the costs associated with federal review
of a TERA application by mandating a 270-day approval period for
TERAs.196 TERA regulations, however, allow for an extension of this
requirement if both the Secretary and the tribe agree to such an extension.197
This raises two interesting questions that have not yet been answered. First,
what happens if the tribe does not consent to an extension—i.e., if a tribe
submits a TERA for a utility-scale wind or solar facility on tribal trust land,
but the Secretary requests an extension of the 270-day review period which
the tribe denies, does the tribe have a cause of action against the Secretary
for which it can recover damages? Second, can the tribe compel the
Secretary to complete the TERA process within the statutorily mandated
270-day period in order to mitigate any financial losses stemming from an
extension?
Although there is no way to know for sure, the answer to the second
question is almost certainly no because there is no statutorily mandated
timeframe in which to complete a NEPA analysis.198 Absent some
contractually obligated duty to complete a NEPA analysis in a certain
timeframe, courts generally do not find agencies to have violated the NEPA
simply because the NEPA analysis requires an extensive amount of time to
complete.199 The standard time period to complete a NEPA analysis varies
from three months or less to one year.200 This timeframe is fluid, and will
almost certainly be greater if an EIS is required.201 Moreover, a suit for
injunctive relief could not commence until after the 270-day review period

196. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(A) (2012) (“Not later than 270 days after the date on which
the Secretary receives a tribal energy resource agreement from an Indian tribe . . . the
Secretary shall approve or disapprove the tribal energy resource agreement.”).
197. 25 C.F.R. § 224.56 (2015) (“The Director's receipt of a tribe's complete application
begins a 270-day statutorily mandated period during which the Secretary must approve or
disapprove a proposed TERA. With the consent of the tribe, the Secretary may extend the
270-day period for making a decision.”).
198. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.8 (2015) (stating that CEQ has not set “inflexible” time limits, but
instead “encourages” agencies to set time limits appropriate for individual actions).
199. Cf. Coal. on W. Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Bodman, 625 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120
(W.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 592 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating Plaintiffs did not show that
DOE’s two-step NEPA analysis violated DOE’s contractual obligation with Plaintiffs to
complete the NEPA analysis without undue delay and in an orderly fashion).
200. NEPA Web Guide: CEQ 40 FAQs, Questions 35-40, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20160302222736/http://www.blm.gov:80/wo/st/en/prog/planning
/nepa/webguide/40_most_asked_questions/questions_30-40.html (Question 35, “Time
Required for the NEPA Process”) (last visited Apr. 21, 2017).
201. Id.
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has run, so even if a court would hear such a suit, it is unlikely that the
redressability component of standing could be met.
The answer to the first question is much more uncertain. If the Secretary
requests an extension of the statutorily mandated 270-day review period,
but the tribe does not consent, then the Secretary is required to fulfill his or
her statutory obligations.202 However, the ITEDSA states that
[T]he United States shall not be liable to any party (including
any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss resulting
from the negotiated terms of, a lease, business agreement, or
right-of-way executed pursuant to and in accordance with a tribal
energy resource agreement approved by the Secretary under
paragraph (2) [relating to the 270-day approval requirement].203
Paragraph 2(A) states that “[n]ot later than 270 days after the date on which
the Secretary receives a tribal energy resource agreement from an Indian
tribe . . . the Secretary shall approve or disapprove the tribal energy
resource agreement.”204 It is clear from the statute that the Secretary is
absolved from liability after the TERA is approved, but the statute is silent
as to whether any liability attaches to the Secretary upon receipt of a TERA
and failure to approve or disapprove within the 270-day timeframe. The
Indian law canons of construction may hue in the tribes’ favor in this
regard, but a general rule of administrative law is that agency decisionmaking is not subject to judicial review until that decision becomes a final
agency action.205 If the Secretary does not meet this 270-day mandate, then
the tribe would have to show that the Secretary unreasonably delayed
deciding on the TERA application,206 or otherwise undertook some agency

202. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2) (2012).
203. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).
204. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(A).
205. Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S.
62, 71 (1970) (“[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process
of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt
the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined
or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
Energy, 663 F.2d 296, 310 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We have previously defined an order as
‘final’ for purposes of judicial review when it ‘impose(s) an obligation, den(ies) a right, or
fix(es) some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.’”) (quoting
Fidelity Television v. FCC, 502 F.2d 443, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
206. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(1)-(2)(a), Pub. L. 89–554, 80 Stat. 378, 393
(codified as 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)-(2)(a) (2012)).
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action that was arbitrary or capricious. The likelihood of success in such an
argument, however, is minimal at best.
The final problem associated with a TERA is that each TERA must
undergo periodic review by the Secretary who may disapprove207 the TERA
if he or she believes that the trust asset managed under the TERA is in
“imminent jeopardy.”208 The Secretary’s ability to continually review and
even disapprove a TERA is curious given the waiver of liability in §
3504.209 Essentially, § 3504 creates a loophole where the federal
government retains oversight authority of tribal resource management even
after a TERA is implemented,210 but the government absolves itself of any
liability once the TERA is approved.211 The fact that no tribe has yet
entered into a TERA indicates the ITEDSA’s failure to promote energy
development in Indian Country, specifically with regards to renewable
energy.
At the least, TERAs are an option available to tribes concerned about
sovereignty and jurisdiction, but TERAs are far from an ideal option for
tribes. Congress’s inclusion of the ITEDSA in the Energy Policy Act of
2005 was a positive sign for both Indian tribes and renewable energy
businesses. However, it is troubling that no tribe has submitted or been
approved for a TERA, especially since TERAs currently represent the
greatest opportunity for tribal self-determination regarding energy
development.212 Even with the TERA structure in place, energy
development in Indian Country proceeds under the traditional model of
tribal leases subject to Secretarial approval. This not only diminishes tribal
sovereignty, but also creates development delays that are costly both for
tribal governments and for non-tribal entities wishing to invest in Indian
energy resources.
IV. Indian Energy Development Projects
Despite all the negative statistics, lack of funding, and inadequate federal
policies surrounding renewable energy development in Indian Country,
some tribal governments, Indian corporations, and nonprofit entities have
207. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.63(b) (2015) (“[T]he Secretary, upon a finding of imminent
jeopardy to a physical trust asset, [may] take actions the Secretary determines to be
necessary to protect the asset, including reassumption under subparts F and G of this part.”).
208. Id. § 224.63(a)-(b).
209. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A)(ii)(D)(ii).
210. Id. § 3504(e)(7)(A)-(D).
211. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(A)(ii)(D)(ii).
212. See Kronk, supra note 190, at 830-34.
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succeeded in meeting the needs of a small number of tribal members who
do not have adequate access to energy. These initiatives range in size,
scope, and goal objectives, but each is uniquely tailored to address a
discrete energy issue in Indian Country.
A. Hopi NativeSUN Solar Electric Enterprise
The Hopi NativeSUN Solar Electric Enterprise (SEE) addresses the
difficulties of access to energy in non-grid areas by issuing low-interest
revolving loans to non-grid property owners so that they can purchase and
install REGU units on their property.213 Participants receive a maximum
loan amount of $7,000 for forty-eight months at an 8% interest rate with
which they purchase the photovoltaic solar cells and storage batteries.214 To
date, SEE has installed more than 300 units on homes in non-grid areas of
Indian Country.215 SEE should be considered a success because it fills a gap
that is not adequately addressed by the market and provides access to
energy to property owners who otherwise do not have it.
B. Navajo Tribal Utility Authority
The Navajo Tribal Utility Authority (NTUA) rents hybrid REGUs that
consist of an 880-watt solar array, a 400-watt wind turbine, and a battery
bank to tribal members in non-grid areas.216 To date, the NTUA has rented
approximately 263 of these REGUs at a cost of approximately $75 per
month.217 The rental costs pay for the NTUA maintenance of the REGUs
and installation training for its personnel. Although the program is funded
in part by federal grant money from the Department of Energy, the NTUA’s
program suffers the same barriers to entry and budget constraints as that of
SEE.218 Like SEE, the NTUA program is an Indian-driven solution to a
213. SALLY MACADAMS, COMMUNITY POWER AGENCY, TOWARDS ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY:
CASE STUDIES FROM NORTH AMERICAN FIRST NATIONS 8-10 (June 2016), http://cpagency.org.
au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Towards-Energy-Sovereignty-First-Nations-case-studies-fromNorth-America.pdf.
214. Id.
215. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73.
216. Wind Turbines Power Remote Navajo Homesteads, NAWIG NEWS: Q. NEWSL. OF THE
NATIVE AM. WIND INTEREST GROUP (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Golden, Colo.), Spring
2004, at 1, http://www.ntua.com/solar/nawig-PV.pdf.
217. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73. However, even those residents who can afford this
price are not eligible for the PTC or ITC because they do not own the REGU.
218. See Ibby Caputo, Solar Power Makes Electricity More Accessible on Navajo
Reservation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/21/4010
00427/solar-power-makes-electricity-more-accessible-on-navajo-reservation (“The Navajo
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problem that is all too prevalent in Indian Country. Although widespread
distribution of the REGUs has not occurred, the program’s success can be
summed up by the statements of one NTUA REGU installer: “We have all
of these big power plants on our reservation, and we benefit very little from
them. Although it creates jobs and produces royalty, we still have to buy
our electricity. These hybrid units are used on the reservation to produce
energy for the people.”219
C. Moapa Micro Grid Project
The Moapa Micro Grid is a 252-kilowatt hybrid solar, wind, and diesel
generator facility that powers the tribe’s business district containing the
tribal council building and a shopping center.220 The business district is the
primary on-reservation employment center.221 The micro grid project was
funded by a $2.38 million grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
High Energy Cost Grant program, which issues grants for energy efficiency
programs in areas where energy costs are 275% above the national
average.222 Prior to the micro grid‘s introduction online, the Moapa
powered the business district with several diesel generators, which cost the
Tribe approximately $1.5 million per year to operate and maintain.223 The
new micro grid is projected to save the Tribe nearly $700,000 per year.224
Since the project is funded with grant money rather than a loan, the savings
to the Tribe are immediate, and the project does not have to undergo a
lengthy return on investment period.225
Tribal Utility Authority has deployed 260 solar panel units, but currently there is no funding
for more.”).
219. Wind Turbines Power Remote Navajo Homesteads, supra note 216, at 2.
220. John L. Smith, Solar Panels Good Deal for Moapa Tribe, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr.
10, 2014), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/solar-panels-good-deal-for-moapa-tribe/.
221. Id.
222. USDA Administrator Joins with Stronghold Engineering and Project Partners to
Dedicate New Solar Project at Moapa Paiute Travel Plaza in Nevada, ALTENERGYMAG.COM
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.altenergymag.com/news/2014/04/08/ usda-administrator-joinswith-stronghold-engineering-and-project-partners-to-dedicate-new-solar-project-at-moapapaiute-travel-plaza-in-nevada/32991.
223. Native Americans and Renewable Energy, 1ST TRIBAL LENDING, https://www.
1tribal.com/2014/09/native-americans-and-renewable-energy/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
224. Id. Similar to the Moapa, the Alaskan village of Tuntutuliak ran on a diesel micro
grid until the tribe, in a partnership with the Alaska Energy Authority, constructed a 450kilowatt wind-diesel hybrid system to power the town. The tribe expects to save
approximately $500,000 and over 70,000 gallons of diesel per year. The previous diesel
system cost the tribe about half of its annual budget. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73.
225. See Smith, supra note 220.
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The Moapa are also planning to bring online the largest utility-scale solar
array on tribal lands by the end of 2016.226 This project will consist of a
250-megawatt solar array,227 and will represent a significant step forward
for the Tribe for two reasons. First, the Tribe has already obtained a power
purchase agreement with the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power,
which guarantees the project’s financial stability.228 Second, the 550megawatt Reid Gardner Generating Station, which is a coal-fired power
plant near the reservation, is scheduled to be fully decommissioned in
2017.229 The Moapa have been active in their opposition to the plant, which
they cite as a cause of asthma, lung diseases, and severe allergies among
tribal members.230 Although the Tribe stands to gain a significant revenue
stream from its utility-scale solar array, the energy generated therefrom will
be almost exclusively consumed off-reservation.231 Therefore, those Moapa
tribal members who do not have grid-access to energy will not see any
direct energy benefit from the project.
D. The Campo Band of Kumeyaay Wind Farm
The Campo Band of Kumeyaay Indians developed a wind farm
consisting of twenty-five two-megawatt turbines on their reservation near
San Diego.232 This project is unique because the Tribe does not receive any
revenue from the energy sales.233 Rather, the Tribe leases the land to a third
party energy developer who owns the wind energy infrastructure, sells the
energy, and receives the financial and tax incentives.234 While it is
beneficial that the Campo Band of Kumeyaay incurs little-to-no financial
risk from the project, the revenue the Tribe receives from the lease
226. First Solar Breaks Ground On 250 MW Moapa Southern Paiute Solar Project,
SOLAR INDUS. MAG. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://solarindustrymag.com/first-solar-breaks-groundon-250-mw-moapa-southern-paiute-solar-project.
227. Id.
228. Emily Hois, 'Coal to Clean Energy' March Highlights Largest Solar Plant on Tribal
Land, SOLARREVIEWS (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.solarreviews.com/news/coal-to-cleanenergy-march-highlights-new-solar-plant-on-tribal-land/.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Monique La Chappa & Melissa Estes, Presentation to the U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
Tribal Energy Meeting: Campo’s Renewable Energy: Security, Independence, and
Economic Development (Nov. 15, 2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f27/re_
dev_campo_wind_estes.pdf.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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agreement is less than it would receive if the Tribe were a partner in the
energy sales.235 However, because the tribal government is not eligible for
federal tax credits, it is financially more prudent to lease the land to a nontribal corporation that can take advantage of the tax credits to offset the
costs of the project.
The most notable aspect of the aforementioned projects is that even
though each is an energy project designed to expand energy availability in
Indian Country, each project addresses access to energy in a different
manner. This underscores not only the breadth of access to energy issues in
Indian Country, but also the complexity of these issues. The lack of access
to energy in Indian Country is not one issue affecting one discrete group of
people. Instead, there are many different energy access issues affecting
different population segments within many different tribes. Although each
of the projects above are different from each other, they all have one thing
in common that significantly contributes to their success: they are Indiandriven solutions to Indian problems. This may seem trivial, but Indian
control over projects in Indian Country—especially development and
economic projects—is strongly correlated with the long-term success of
those projects, as well as Indian perceptions of those projects.
Consequently, even though non-tribal entities may be involved in
renewable energy development projects in Indian Country, it is important
that these entities both recognize and respect tribal input, even if the tribe is
not a majority shareholder or otherwise does not have a controlling interest
in the project.
V. Conclusion
Understanding the history of the United States’ policy toward Indians is
critical to understanding the current issues that affect access to energy in
Indian Country. Issues of access to energy in Indian Country developed
over the span of many decades, and solutions to these issues will likely take
several more decades to formulate and implement. Improving access to
energy in Indian Country will require not only significant changes to the
federal regulatory scheme for renewable energy development, but will also
require the creativity and tenacity of the Indian people whose everyday
lives are shaped by their energy access. There are already promising signs
from both tribal governments and tribal members that greater focus,
awareness, and effort are being placed on expanding energy access in
Indian Country. Renewable energy development has the potential to create
235. MEISEN, supra note 77, at 16-17.
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a significant economic revenue stream for the tribal government, and
possibly even individual tribal members who can sell surplus energy back
to the grid. The question going forward is whether the federal government
will work proactively to amend the statutory and regulatory structure to
better suit the needs of the Indians so that tribal governments’ renewable
energy development is cost-competitive with renewable energy
development by private investors.
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